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 Introduction 
 This chapter takes an interdisciplinary approach to the subject of memorializa-
tion and commemoration, protest and populism in relation to the performative 
enacting and official presentation of difficult history. It analyzes the various 
actors instrumentalizing the same dark heritage in different ways, by differ-
ent means, and for different purposes, to draw conclusions about processes 
of coming to terms with the past ( Vergangenheitsbewältigung ) in relation to the 
contemporary context of populism and migration. 
 It analyzes a range of case studies connected to the memory and heri-
tage of the 13 February 1945 firebombing of Dresden by the British Royal 
Air Force, under the command of Arthur ‘Bomber’ Harris, and the US Air 
Force. These case studies include museums, heritage sites, public exhibi-
tions, ‘official’ city commemorations, ‘unofficial’ public commemorative acts, 
protests and counter-protests, and interviews with supporters of Germany’s 
populist  Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) party from Dresden. 1 Location not 
only of the 1945 firebombing but also the former GDR’s third city and cul-
tural nexus, Dresden is potentially now equally well known for the populist 
group Pegida (whose acronym stands for ‘Patriotic Europeans against the 
Islamisation of the Occident’) as it is for its art, music, and historic archi-
tecture. Previous analyses of the notion of Germans as ‘victims’ of World 
War II as well as perpetrators have addressed the mediation of this history 
and cultural memory more generally (in particular  Niven 2006 ;  Joel 2013 ). 
Taking theoretical work from a range of disciplines, including Habermas’s 
idea of ‘communicative action’ and rational discourse ( 1984 ), Ruth Wodak’s 
work on a ‘politics of fear’ ( 2015 ) and Jeffery Olick’s on the ‘politics of 
regret’ ( 2007 ), Aleida Assmann’s on traumatic memory ( 2016 ) and Sharon 
Macdonald’s on difficult heritage and memory ( 2009 ,  2013 ) as its founda-
tion, the chapter will examine in detail empirical data from fieldwork at these 
multiple sites and events. The range of case studies permits both a broad and 
a deep questioning of the realms of instrumentality within cultural policy, 
museums, heritage, and collective cultural memory practices. The analysis 
combines the theoretical with the empirical in arguing that two axes exist 
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within commemorative, museum, and protest practices – an axis of  appropria-
tion and an axis of  appropriateness . 
 This provides a new theoretically based approach for scholars – whether 
from heritage, museum, or memory studies or from political, discourse, or 
populism studies – to frame and analyze uses of the past in relation to con-
temporary social and cultural phenomena (and vice versa). Going beyond the 
dichotomy of the victim/perpetrator narrative (part of what I term the axis 
of appropriation, based on either a ‘politics of fear’ or a ‘politics of shame and 
pity’), it identifies a second, intersecting public dichotomous narrative. This 
focuses on the contrast between practices of commemoration, protest, and rep-
resentations of the past which appear ‘emotional’ and those which appear to be 
‘rational’ (part of what I term the axis of appropriateness). 
 This detailed examination of the Dresden 13 February commemorations 
and memory practices therefore illuminates the strategies within official and 
unofficial practices. It also frames the actions, arguments, and behaviour of 
the various actors in relation to both contemporary society and theories of 
communication, memory, and heritage, and draws out the interconnections 
between them within the ongoing dynamics of  Vergangenheitsbewältigung . 
 Analytical framing 
 The notion of ‘dark heritage’ is one which has emerged from various perspec-
tives of looking at the difficult, contested, and problematic parts of the past, in 
relation to how they are presented to the public today, and why people choose 
to visit sites associated with such pasts. The associated phenomenon of ‘dark 
tourism’ has been an object of academic study since the 1990s ( Seaton 1996 ; 
Foley and Lennon 1996;  Stone 2011 ;  Stone et al. 2018 ). 
 Over recent decades, heritage and museum studies scholars have examined 
various aspects of dark heritage in order to understand the impact of difficult 
history on museums, heritage, public memory, commemoration, the ways in 
which such histories are presented to or hidden from the public, and the public 
responses to their encounters with these histories and public presentations of 
them. Macdonald coined the terms ‘continual unsettlement’ ( 2009 : 192) and 
‘past-presencing’ ( 2013 ) in relation to the need for a future-facing and ongo-
ing engagement with difficult pasts in the present. She emphasizes that this is 
intended to disrupt ‘linear notions of past preceding present preceding future’ 
( 2013 : 16). 
 The emerging academic discipline of memory studies is rooted in the work 
of Nora (1989) and Halbwachs and Coser (1992) but also connects to dark 
heritage, difficult histories, and how different memories and commemorative 
acts influence and shape societies. Much of this is based on traumatic memory 
in relation to the Holocaust and the changing collective, cultural responses 
to it ( Hirsch 2012 ;  Rothberg 2009 ;  Olick 2007 ;  Caruth 1995 ). Aleida Ass-
mann’s work (especially  2016 ) is particularly relevant to this study, in that it 
addresses the ongoing relationship between the history and memory of the 
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recent German past with strategies for developing new memory discourses 
within contemporary societies.  Levi and Rothberg (2018 ) specifically address 
the challenge of how memory studies can engage with the contemporary far 
right’s use of memory in a transnational and globalized society. 
 Analysis of memory in relation to public commemoration is inevitably 
linked to issues of emotion – and even more so when the commemoration is 
both for a contested past and through controversial practices and actors, such 
as the far right. While emotion was considered to have been a neglected sub-
ject matter within academic study (Williams and Bendelow, in Bendelow and 
Williams  1997 : xii), the history of emotions has been analyzed ( Frevert 2011 ; 
 Plamper 2015 ). The practices of ‘instrumental cultural policy’ ( Gray 2007 ) and 
the strategic use of emotions, affect, and empathy in museums and the heri-
tage sector is widespread – particularly in the Anglophone countries – with a 
growing body of academic research ( Smith, Wetherell and Campbell 2018 ). In 
Germany, however, there has long been a more guarded and sceptical view of 
instrumentalism and intentionally emotive engagement with the past in cultural 
policy, museums, and the heritage sector, largely in response to the propaganda 
uses of the past by the Nazis ( Burns and van der Will 2003 ;  Eckersley 2007 , 
 2012 ). This legacy ( Sternfeld 2013 : 38) is still evident in Germany within 
museum practice and the attitudes of cultural sector professionals. Therefore, 
museums and the heritage sector in Germany are expected to provide factual, 
objective presentations of the past for their visitors, whether in relation to 
objects, sites of memory, or practices of commemoration. 
 In light of this, Habermas’s work on communicative action and discourses of 
rationality ( 1984 ) becomes significant in aiding a reading of the events observed 
for this study. Habermas’s ideas on communication, rationalism, and instru-
mentalism have been the basis of both research and criticism in various disci-
plines. Crossley’s critical analysis of Habermas’s failure to include emotion as 
a factor (in  Bendelow and Williams 1997 : 29) is particularly relevant to this 
chapter. For Crossley, Habermas sees  communicative rationality as underpinning 
communicative situations which are focused on understanding and agreement, 
while  instrumental rationality is the basis of a strategic form of thinking and 
communicating, the purpose of which is a given desired outcome based on a 
“means-end calculation” (ibid.), rather than mutual understanding. 
 It is on this broad and interdisciplinary foundation that this study rests, 
taking a deep view of the phenomenon of dark heritage, memory, and com-
memoration. The chapter does this through a wide selection of cultural case 
studies focusing on public presentations and practices relating to the 13 Febru-
ary 1945 bombing of Dresden. 
 Approaching the field 
 A significant body of fieldwork data was collected during a one-week period 
in Dresden in February 2018. This week (8–14 February 2018) of intensive 
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immersion into the official and unofficial practices and processes of memory, 
commemoration, and presentation provided a wide range of material for analy-
sis, gathered using a combination of approaches from anthropology, museum 
and heritage studies, and memory studies. This data allows for particularly rich 
insights, firstly into the issue of how and why the presentation and commemo-
ration of a difficult past can continue to be so challenging for public cultural 
organizations. Secondly, it exposes the heightened tensions present within the 
city in a compressed time and space, and the emotive nature of public participa-
tion within official and unofficial, political and civic acts of memory. 
 Fieldwork included architectural and display analysis, staff interviews at Dres-
den’s Military History Museum (MHM) and City Museum, and a qualitative, 
semi-structured interview with a representative of the Saxon regional govern-
ment’s culture department. Exhibition analysis was undertaken at the Dresden 
1945 Panorama, and site analysis in and around the  Frauenkirche . Attendance 
and participant observation at a commemorative concert, at the official public 
commemoration ceremony at the  Heidefriedhof , and at official public partici-
patory commemorations were included. Several protests and counter-protests 
taking place within the city of Dresden during the time frame were observed. 
These included a neo-Nazi march (on 10 February) and associated left-wing 
counter-protest; a populist right-wing commemorative protest (on 13 February) 
and the simultaneous left-wing counter-protest; and numerous smaller public 
acts of commemorative intervention in the city. Additional data from inter-
views undertaken by an associated researcher in 2017 with AfD ( Alternative für 
Deutschland , a populist right-wing party) supporters in Dresden are brought to 
bear on the material gathered in February 2018. 
 The myth of Dresden – appropriation and 
appropriateness 
 The ongoing use and misuse of the ‘victim narrative’ as part of the popular 
memory and populist revisionism of the Dresden 1945 firebombings, from the 
immediate period after the bombing and before the end of World War II, through 
the GDR, and to the present day has been analyzed extensively ( Niven 2006 ; 
 Joel 2013 ;  Gegner and Ziino 2012 : 197–218, Dresdner Hefte 84 and 115). The 
idea of the ‘ Mythos Dresden ’ (Neutzner in Dresdner Hefte 84: 38–48) is based 
on the notion of Dresden as a ‘special city’ due to its Baroque architecture and 
artistic and musical strengths combined with historically inaccurate perspec-
tives of it as an ‘innocent city’ – based on factually incorrect ideas that it was 
populated primarily by German refugees, women, children, and the elderly, 
and of no military significance. The resonance of this continues to shape and 
influence much of the contemporary discourse, commemorative, cultural, and 
museological practice within the city. 
 The far right have long used the victim narrative as a means by which to jus-
tify their presence at and public participation in the official commemorations, 
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even to some extent shaping the nature of the official commemorations – 
whether by causing such disruption that the city and Land governments 
chose not to hold official commemorations (Haase in Dresdner Hefte 115: 
4–14) or, from 2005 onwards, through their influence  within the city and 
Land assemblies, as elected members of those houses (Neutzner in Dresdner 
Hefte 115: 75–85). 
 Academic discussion of the Dresden firebombing and its memory has 
therefore previously focused primarily on the problematics of this perceived 
victim/perpetrator dichotomy. Significant as this still is, a second appar-
ent dichotomy emerges from the current analysis of these events, which is 
equally significant – if not more so – in its relation to the changing dynam-
ics of  Vergangenheitsbewältigung and the future. This focuses on the behaviours 
(and the  perception of behaviour) of those commemorating and protesting the 
remembrance of the Dresden 1945 firebombing – an apparent dichotomy of 
behaviour which appears as either ‘emotional’ or ‘rational’. These two sup-
posed dichotomies can be better understood as two axes. The use of victim/
perpetrator narratives by various groups in relation to the past, as well as 
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 Image 10.1 The axes of appropriation and appropriateness. 
 Source: Graphic by Susannah Eckersley 
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in relation to the social context of the present, is represented by the axis of 
 appropriation . The use of supposedly emotional or rational behaviours and 
communications is represented by the axis of  appropriateness . 
 Against the backdrop of contemporary politics and discourses around mul-
ticulturalism, the integration of refugees, and the perceived marginalization of 
autochthonous populations, the impact of Dresden’s specific history during and 
after the Third Reich, in the GDR, and following German reunification on 
the city and its population adds to the layers utilized within the axes of appro-
priation and appropriateness. 
 Appropriation of the past – the Holocaust as frame 
for both victim and perpetrator narratives 
 The ‘anniversary week’ in 2018 included multiple events, connected either 
to Dresden’s civic institutions and representatives or to grassroots civil society 
actors and groups. In adherence with Germany’s laws of assembly, all offi-
cially registered demonstrations are both regulated and protected. Participant 
observation undertaken at many of these events confirmed the use of ‘victim’ 
and ‘perpetrator’ narratives, both framed around differing attitudes towards 
the Holocaust and its status within the present memory complex ( Macdonald 
2013 ) of Dresden. 
 Far-right groups, who gathered for a ‘ Gedenkmarsch ’ (memorial march) 
through the streets of Dresden on 10 February, positioned themselves as 
mourning victims of a past which they see as being inadequately commem-
orated, all framed in relation to relativizing the Holocaust. Around 600 
self-proclaimed neo-Nazis marched, carrying banners which included the 
groups’ far-right affiliations. These clearly positioned their revisionist view 
of the bombing of Dresden in relation to this victim narrative by including 
slogans such as ‘Dresden’s Bombing Holocaust’ or showing inflated numbers 
of dead from the firebombing as a counterpoint to the numbers of Holo-
caust victims. 
 The city’s official public commemoration of the anniversary of the bombing 
was a wreath-laying ceremony at the Heidefriedhof on the edges of the city, 
the site of the largest burial of ashes from the firebombing victims. Attended by 
official representatives from the Dresden Synod, the CDU (Christian Demo-
cratic Union), members of Pegida, the AfD, the NPD (National Democratic 
Party of Germany – a far-right-wing political party), and uniformed mem-
bers of at least two  Burschenschaften (historically based right-wing student 
‘fraternities’) – the Dresden branch of Burschenschaft Arminia zu Leipzig and 
the Dresdener Burschenschaft Salamandria – as well as descendants of the dead, 
this sombre event was marked by the highly visible presence of armed police 
in protective clothing. The official commemoration included speeches, music, 
and a sombre procession to the 13 February memorial, with reflection at the 
Holocaust memorial en route. 
 Image 10.2  Banners from the neo-Nazi ‘Gedenkmarsch’ on 10 February 2018. Banner 
slogans read, a: ‘We remember the victims of the bombing Holocaust on 
Dresden’ and ‘The bombing of Dresden was a crime against humanity’, and 
b:  ‘We remember the victims of the Allied bombing terror’. 
 Source: Photos by Susannah Eckersley 
a
b
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 Image 10.3  AfD (a) and Burschenschaftler (b) carrying wreaths at the Heidefriedhof com-
memoration on 13 February 2018. 
 Source: Photos by Susannah Eckersley 
a
b
 The AfD and NPD representatives and the Burschenschaftler, although 
ostensibly accompanying the official commemoration, separated themselves 
from it. The AfD and Burschenschaftler processed directly to the 13 Febru-
ary memorial in advance of the main commemoration, and the NPD after 
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the main commemoration – both groups very pointedly  not pausing at the 
Holocaust memorial on their way to the firebombing memorial. The wreaths 
they laid included ribbons with messages focusing on victims and the duty to 
remember them. To one side of the main proceedings a couple of police offi-
cers easily and quickly prevented an attempt to protest against the commemo-
ration by a small group whose banner read ‘ Where were you on 27 January? ’, 
referring to Holocaust Memorial Day. This vignette highlights one of the key 
points of contest within the memory of 13 February as it is enacted by different 
groups, as well as of much of Germany’s dark heritage – the centrality of the 
Holocaust as a frame for both victim and perpetrator narratives. 
 The ‘perpetrator narrative’ underpins much of both the left-wing activism 
and protest as well as the official presentations of Dresden’s firebombing and 
its commemoration. Dresden’s City Museum and Military History Museum 
(MHM) situate their presentations of the history of the firebombing very clearly 
and intentionally within the context and consequences of the Nazi regime and 
the Holocaust. They do so in a ‘factual’ manner which aims to reject the ‘Dres-
den myth’ and instead underline the population’s complicity in Nazism, and to 
contextualize their suffering as a result of the firebombing. A member of the 
staff from Dresden’s City Museum reflected on the challenge of this: 
 We ask ourselves this all the time, why is it so special here? Of course, 
immediately after the destruction the National Socialists built up the myth 
idea – the number of victims, the innocence of the city – this was immedi-
ately built up and was then carried on in the GDR. The ‘Anglo-American 
bomb terror’, ‘innocent city’ and so on . . . it has stuck, and it gets carried 
 Image 10.4  Wreaths at the Heidefriedhof memorial. 
 Source: Photo by Susannah Eckersley 
 Image 10.5  Wreaths laid by Burschenschaft Arminia zu Leipzig and the NPD, whose dedi-
cations read: ‘In deepest mourning for the German victims’, and ‘We remember 
the victims of 13 February 1945’ respectively. 
 Source: Photo by Susannah Eckersley 
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on more and more. . . . So I see it as a duty to make sure that this is re-
factualised or objectivised more. 
 (Interviewee from City Museum) 
 Breaking down the myths of Dresden as an ‘innocent city’ and the emotive 
power of the idea of ‘countless victims’ through the use of historical evidence 
and factual, somewhat detached, information-giving and museum interpreta-
tion texts is therefore a conscious and considered strategy to counter populist 
and revisionist discourses on Dresden’s past. In both the City Museum and 
MHM, the Dresden bombing displays contain a minimal number of objects, 
using a few deeply symbolic objects combined with text providing factual 
information on the bombing and its consequences. In the MHM, Dresden is 
juxtaposed with other cities which suffered significant bombing during World 
War II: an intentional strategy to undermine the notion of Dresden’s ‘unique-
ness’ in the history of aerial warfare (interviewee from MHM). In the City 
Museum, the historical context prior to and subsequent to the bombing is 
emphasized, again, as an intentional strategy to undermine the myth of Dres-
den as an ‘innocent city’ and a city of ‘powerless victims’ (interviewee from 
City Museum). The agency of both individuals and groups, as perpetrators 
and  Mitläufer (fellow-travellers) within Nazism, is communicated by means 
of the objects on display and their positioning and interpretation within the 
museum space. 
 The city’s cultural and heritage organizations’ commemorative activities also 
focused on the history of Dresden’s complicity within Nazism and the Holo-
caust, whether in relation to specific places associated with the Nazi regime’s 
programme of discrimination against Jews (such as at the sites of the  Stiftung 
Sächsische Gedenkstätten ) or in marking and making visible traces of the victims 
and the perpetrators of Nazism within the city of Dresden (for example the 
plaque commemorating the deportation of Jews at Dresden-Neustadt station). 
Events were organized by multiple groups from religious and civic organi-
zations, creating a plethora of memorializing and commemorative activities 
within the space of a few days, many of which had the Holocaust and Holo-
caust memory as their focus. 2 This includes  Freunde der Frauenkirche (Friends 
of the Frauenkirche) – an organization whose basis is in the peace movement 
which was active in the GDR as a form of anti-government protest ( Niven 
2006 : 116–117) – and other cultural actors. For example, Shostakovich’s 13th 
Symphony,  Babi Yar , 3 was performed by the Dresden Philharmonic in the 
Dresden Kulturpalast concert hall on 11 and 13 February for their annual 
‘ Gedenkkonzert ’ (memorial concert), again juxtaposing the atrocities commit-
ted against Jews during the Nazi regime and the Holocaust with the contem-
porary processes and controversies around the memorialization of 13 February 
in Dresden. 
 This focus on the victims of Nazism and the strategic awareness-raising of 
Dresdeners’ complicity has two purposes. Firstly, it attempts to undermine the 
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 Image 10.6  The ‘Dresden View’ in the Military History Museum Dresden, positioning 
destroyed paving stones from Dresden with destroyed architectural elements 
from Rotterdam and other cities bombed during World War II. 
 Source: Photo by Susannah Eckersley 
victim narrative of the right wing by highlighting the context of the bomb-
ing internationally as well as locally, as the museums do. Secondly, it aims to 
draw out the history and rich culture of religious pluralism in Dresden’s past 
and thereby make parallels with contemporary discourses around multicultur-
alism and belonging. The ensuing narrative of peace based on the Holocaust 
remembrance phrase of ‘never again’ connects to the contemporary ideal of a 
‘culture of welcome’ towards refugees and migrants. This is publicly articulated 
as a strategy to counter the right-wing populist and extremist activity within 
the city. While those adhering to either a victim or a perpetrator narrative are 
diametrically opposed in their understanding of history and politics, what they 
have in common is that both are appropriating and instrumentalizing the past as 
a means to shape the future and in counterpoint to present perceptions of reality. 
 Appropriation through transposition – a  politics of 
fear as opposed to a  politics of shame and pity 
 Dynamic and contested processes of dealing with Germany’s difficult past 
within changing social contexts have been central to coming to terms with 
it – to  Vergangenheitsbewältigung – as the  Historikerstreit of the 1980s aptly dem-
onstrates (the ‘historians’ debate’ raised by Habermas and Nolte is documented 
in  Augstein 1987 ). Through the varied examples relating to Dresden, we can 
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see how the appropriation and instrumentalization of a dark heritage takes on 
an added layer of meaning when transposed onto contemporary social conflicts. 
 Significantly, the narrative of perceived German victimhood is used by 
populist groups not only in relation to the bombing of Dresden as an event 
from the past; in fact, they transpose it onto the contemporary politics of the 
‘migration crisis’ of multiculturalism and the integration of refugees in Dres-
den. Their position as supposed ‘victim’, seen in the discourses centring on 
February 1945, is also re-appropriated to underpin their anti-immigration 
standpoint, as seen in this interview with an AfD supporter in Dresden: 
 What upsets me is that . . . we get a tiny pension and the so-called refugees 
get everything. . . . We have to find a normal way again, where foreigners 
are not valued as better people than Germans. 
 (Interviewee 16) 
 The perpetuation of a collective victim mentality results in part in a perceived 
need for self-protection within the group, combined with the active and at 
times aggressive ‘othering’ of those who may threaten this status. While in 
Dresden in the past, these ‘others’ consisted of intellectual, cultural, or political 
‘elites’, such as left-wing and centre politicians, civil servants, church leaders, 
academics, and cultural sector professionals, in particular historians (see Richter 
in Dresdner Hefte Nr. 115: 63–70) – an ‘oppositional habitus’ ( Wodak 2015 : 
47) – the focus has shifted more recently to less powerful ‘others’. The devel-
opment of the Pegida group, notably in Dresden originally, and the success 
of the AfD in gaining seats in both Dresden’s city hall and the regional Saxon 
parliament means that criticism of these previously ‘elite’ bastions of civic and 
regional power would now be something of an own goal. Instead, a shift to a 
‘governmental habitus’ ( Wodak 2015 : 47) and a re-appropriation of the victim 
narrative has been necessary. 
 The focus of right-wing populist criticism in Dresden has therefore shifted 
from elites to some of the most vulnerable in the local population, refugees 
from Syria, Iraq, and elsewhere, and those whose appearance marks them out as 
visibly different to the majority of the local population. Within the discourses 
of Pegida and the AfD, the term ‘refugee’ or ‘asylum seeker’ has become syn-
onymous not with victimhood and innocence (terms the right-wing populists 
reserve for German refugees during the Dresden bombing), but instead with 
perpetration and malicious intent. For example: ‘The AfD always warned us 
that a lot of asylum seekers are criminals’ (Interviewee 2); or 
 The AfD has pointed out that among all refugees that came here, 500,000 
are unregistered, therefore illegal in Germany. Most of them are terrorists 
or at least primitive people. Most of those who come to our country sim-
ply have no morals, no decency. 
 (Interviewee 8) 
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 and finally, ‘I could tell you hundreds of examples showing that these people 
who came to us are not refugees, but social asylum seekers, parasites’ (Inter-
viewee 11). The discourses observed from Pegida and AfD supporters both 
during the anniversary week and in these interviews make it evident that the 
notion of the German as ‘victim’ is being transposed from those impacted 
by World War II bombing by so-called ‘Anglo-American’ bombers (a phrase 
stemming from Nazi and GDR propaganda) to contemporary Dresdeners with 
xenophobic fears of being ‘overwhelmed’ by non-European, non-Christian 
refugees. This may seem ironic, given the centrality of the idea of ‘innocent 
refugees’ to the 1945 Dresden victim narrative. However, the appropriation 
and perpetuation of Pegida and AfD supporters’ historically based victim men-
tality in relation to contemporary issues align with both psychological and 
cultural analysis of trauma and memory ( Caruth 1995 ;  Hirsch 2012 ;  Rothberg 
2009 ). This re-appropriation of the past and transposition of the victim mental-
ity onto the present is very evident when this AfD supporter speaks of heritage: 
 In Europe we had a bad heritage with the First and Second World War. . . . 
In Germany . . . we have feelings of guilt, we have to. . . . There is a limit to 
everything. And with everything the government did in the past years, the 
limit is exceeded and that is dangerous for the German and European heri-
tage. When we have an Islamic caliphate in Germany one day, the Euro-
pean heritage is gone. Maybe it sounds exaggerating, but I think we should 
be really careful. Many of the Muslim refugees have dangerous thoughts in 
their minds. Otherwise you would not think of driving a bus into a crowd 
[referring to the December 2016 attack on Breitscheidplatz in Berlin]. 
 (Interviewee 16) 
 Furthermore, the victim mentality follows the characteristics of a ‘micro-
politics of fear’ outlined by Ruth Wodak, where she argues that key discursive 
strategies employed by right-wing populists include the reversal of victim-
perpetrator narratives, combined with blame-shifting and revisionist historical 
narratives, underpinned by ‘the  topos of history and the  topos of saviour ’ ( 2015 : 
66–67). The central significance of ‘the past’, ‘history’, ‘heritage’, and ‘mem-
ory’ to populist rhetoric is again evident from analyses of populism as a whole 
and in the specific examples of the 13 February commemorations and pro-
tests in Dresden. Indeed, Assmann’s ‘Guidelines for Dealing Peaceably with 
National Memories’ (2007: 11–25) could almost have been used in reverse to 
inform the practices and discourses which have emerged in Dresden. The ide-
als of progressive memory work, as outlined in Assmann’s ‘guidelines’ (ibid.) 
and Macdonald’s ‘past-presencing’, are being appropriated as a tactic of the 
politics of fear, where blame-shifting and othering as part of the conflation of 
different victim-narratives are merged into contemporary political discourse, 
civic action, and far-right commemorative practices, which are themselves 
instrumentalized to mobilize public support for populist nationalism. 
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 The left-wing protest events observed in Dresden also framed their argu-
ments simultaneously on both the Holocaust and on contemporary multi-
culturalism. Many of the same protesters took part in the counter-protests 
to the right-wing march on 10 February and on the evening of 13 Febru-
ary. Music, dancing, the provision of hot food and drink, and the presence 
of many families with young children created something of a party atmo-
sphere in the early phases of the left-wing protests, in marked contrast to 
the sombre, funereal atmosphere created intentionally by both the neo-Nazi 
‘ Gedenkmarsch ’ on 10 February and the AfD candlelit commemoration on 
the  Altmarkt (old market square) on 13 February. The counter-protests to 
the right-wing demonstrations on the evening of 13 February also trans-
posed discourses from the past onto those of the present – firstly, Holocaust 
remembrance and the narrative of the ‘ordinary German’ as perpetrator, and 
secondly, multiculturalism and a culture of welcome for contemporary refu-
gees. This re-appropriation of the past in relation to the present was evident 
in the banners, chants, and flags, for example, the banner about Holocaust 
Memorial Day seen at the Heidefriedhof reappeared. Others addressed Ger-
man perpetration and contemporary racism. Clearly audible chants switched 
from ‘there is no right to Nazi propaganda’, to ‘refugees are welcome here’ 
and back again, while rainbow flags and ‘Refugees Welcome’ flags were 
waved. Such examples show how left-wing groups, as well as the radical 
right, appropriate leitmotifs from the past, transposing them into the present 
and instrumentalizing them to further their political objectives in the pres-
ent day and for the future. 
 As the evening of the thirteenth progressed, and the number of riot police 
on the Altmarkt increased visibly to keep the two demonstrations – the AfD/
Pegida ‘ stilles gedenken ’ (silent commemoration) and the left-wing counter-
demonstration – apart, the atmosphere became heated and tense. A small num-
ber of the left-wing protesters surged towards the right-wing demonstration 
to mount a sit-in. This sparked a reaction from the police, who proceeded to 
kettle all of the left-wing protesters (and passers-by who happened to be in 
that part of the Altmarkt), not allowing anyone to leave the area for the next 
few hours, despite the sub-zero temperatures. At the same time, the right-
wing demonstration was permitted to continue unhindered and even protected 
by the police, with AfD representatives giving speeches and participants able 
to move freely within the Altmarkt and to leave it unhindered. 4 While this 
ostensibly adheres to German laws of assembly providing officially sanctioned 
demonstrations protection from hindrance and possible violence, as both the 
right- and left-wing demonstrations were formally registered and approved, 
both should have been accorded equitable treatment from the police. 5 The 
discourse of peace was therefore evident within the left-wing protest but set 
within the apparently contradictory setting of disturbance strategies, including 
noise, aggressive language, and the physicality of sit-down blockades as part of 
their counter-protest activities. 
a
bc
 Image 10.7  Left-wing protest banners from the evening of 13 February 2018 at the Alt-
markt, Dresden, reading, a: ‘Where were you on 27 January?’; b: ‘Your racism 
makes us sick’; c: ‘German perpetrators are no victims’; and d: ‘You are not 
responsible for that which has happened, but you are responsible that it never 
happens again’. 
 Source: Photos by Susannah Eckersley 
d
 Image 10.8  Candles in front of the Frauenkirche during the bell ringing on the evening of 
13 February 2018. 
 Source: Photo by Susannah Eckersley 
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 The final event on 13 February was the official candlelit commemoration 
during the ringing of the Frauenkirche bells, which toll from 9.45pm until 
10pm – marking the time from the sounding of the air-raid sirens to the first 
wave of bombing. This otherwise silent and uncontextualized symbolic act of 
commemoration attracted large numbers of people (many of whom may have 
come from other events earlier in the evening, whether right- or left-wing 
demonstrations or civic commemorations), who stood alongside one another 
in silent reflection. During the GDR years, the ruins of the Frauenkirche 
(it was not rebuilt until the 1990s) had become a kind of peace memorial – a 
focus for the growing anti-GDR and pro-peace movement (Joel in  Gegner and 
Ziino 2012 ;  Niven 2006 : 116–117). The symbolism of peace was uppermost 
not only at the Frauenkirche, but also at other civic commemorative acts, such 
as the human chain organized by the rector of Dresden’s Technical University, 
Professor Hans Müller-Steinhagen. This involved thousands of people – ordinary 
citizens, including many families, politicians, academics, and significant figures 
within the cultural sector – forming a human chain around the old town of 
Dresden. They held hands in silence for several minutes, in a symbolic act of 
both mourning and protection, before dispersing into the city again just as the 
right- and left-wing demonstrations on the Altmarkt (which is on the edge of 
the old town) began. 
 These narratives of peace and of welcome not only put the bombing into 
the historical context of Nazi perpetration but again transpose it onto the 
contemporary narrative relating to refugee, migration, and multiculturalism 
 Image 10.9  The human chain commemoration at the Dresden Altmarkt in the early eve-
ning of 13 February 2018. 
 Source: Photo by Susannah Eckersley 
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issues. Again, the protesters, activists, and cultural professionals (whether in 
museums, music venues, or memorial sites) use appropriation as a tactic of 
their politics – this time to highlight narratives of peace and multiculturalism. 
This is based on what I will call a politics of shame and pity. This is differ-
ent to Jeffrey Olick’s notion of a politics of regret ( 2007 ), given its direc-
tion towards the contemporary and future world, with parallels being drawn 
between Germany’s Nazi past and the recent ‘refugee crisis’. Olick describes 
‘a kind of political guilt or public culture of collective remorse [which] has 
taken unique and historically important forms in the Federal Republic of 
Germany’ ( 2007 : 13) and sees the politics of regret as related to ‘peace and 
reconciliation’ efforts within national political frames, such as Germany or 
South Africa (ibid.: 15). While this may be the foundation for much of the 
historical political memory and commemorative actions in Germany more 
broadly, the Dresden situation is more complex. On the one hand, those see-
ing themselves as ‘victims’ of the firebombing are part of the same national, 
civic, and cultural community as those who see themselves as descendants of 
the ‘perpetrators’ of Nazi crimes – the difference is not based on divergent 
pasts, but on differing perceptions and memories among individuals with a 
shared past experience and history. On the other hand, those adhering to a 
politics of shame (at the German past) and pity (for both past victims and for 
contemporary refugees) are not working through guilt and regret in order 
to achieve reconciliation with (or between) victims or perpetrators of past 
wrongs (as Olick describes in relation to earlier German political narratives 
of working through the past, ibid.). Instead, they are using it as a means 
to endorse a contemporary political discourse of inclusion, to differentiate 
themselves from the populist and extreme right, and potentially as a form of 
redemptive ‘self-flagellation’ (see also  Olick 2007 : 143 for the ways in which 
such ‘self-flagellation’ appeared within German politics of the 1960s) in what 
has been described as a ‘politics of pity’ in relation to media representations 
of refugees ( Chouliaraki and Stolic 2017 ). Groups identified here as partici-
pating in both the politics of fear and the politics of shame and pity utilize 
 strategic and  selective appropriations of the past and then re-appropriate these 
in and for the present. 
 Appropriateness in the present – strategies of 
communication and behaviour 
 Returning to the idea of communication and the notion of rationality at this 
point allows for analysis of a further significant layer of the memory, com-
memoration, representation, and action around the Dresden firebombing. The 
notion of a supposed ‘rationality’ in discourse, behaviour, or presentations of 
the past (whether in museums or memorial sites or at events such as commemo-
rations) can be related back to Crossley’s analysis of rationality and communi-
cation in Habermas’s work (in  Bendelow and Williams 1997 ), and also back 
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to  Olick (1997 ). In analyzing German collective responses to the Holocaust, 
Olick raises the idea of rationality connected to an 
 unwillingness to accept collective guilt .  .  . [which] reflected Germans’ 
inability to understand their own implication in what had happened . . . 
there is widespread evidence that many German people – often obsessed 
with their own victimhood – could not even imagine why anyone should 
think that collective guilt was appropriate. 
 ( Olick 1997 : 928) 
 Crossley points out that ‘we have expectations about reasonable and appropriate 
emotional responses to certain types of situations and we make judgements 
about the appropriateness and reasonableness of such responses’ (in  Bendelow 
and Williams 1997 : 19). Judgements about ‘appropriateness’ are being made on 
many levels in relation to Dresden – by museum professionals, by civic and reli-
gious representatives, by activists, protesters, and populists in civic society, by 
the police and legal officials from the  Versammlungsbehörde (Office for Assem-
blies), and by the media and general public. 
 One of the factors influencing museum practices and display strategies in 
Germany is a general distaste for what may be perceived as the ‘instrumental’ 
or ‘sensational’, which can be seen within German cultural policy more widely 
( Eckersley 2007 ). This appears to stem from a reaction against the Nazi use of 
cultural institutions including museums and exhibitions as a key part of their 
propaganda – an extreme example of instrumentality in cultural policy, but 
one which has arguably had a lasting impact on the structures of culture as well 
as on actors and participants within the cultural sector and the general public 
(ibid.). The two museum examples have already shown how the notion of a 
need for ‘factual’ and unemotional presentations of the past is articulated by 
museum curators and directors, not only – but particularly urgently – in the 
case of controversial uses of the past, such as in Dresden. 
 The expectations for a museum exhibition may be very different to those for 
a commemoration, and certainly the expectations for a protest are very differ-
ent to both. However, when one protest is framed as being an act of commem-
oration and the other is framed as a counter-protest, the expectations about 
what might be considered ‘reasonable and appropriate’ behaviour and responses 
for each come into conflict with one another. Layered above that is the frame 
of what might be considered ‘reasonable and appropriate’ for a far-right march 
in Germany, set within the bounds of what is or is not legal within German 
freedom of expression laws, combined with laws protecting the German dem-
ocratic constitution. Of course, no matter how apparently ‘rational’ or ‘factual’ 
a form of communication may appear or may be intended to appear, there is 
almost always an emotional appeal behind communicative praxis (Crossley in 
 Bendelow and Williams 1997 : 30). This is evident within the museum staff 
interviews, where the intent behind their preference for ‘factual’ display is to 
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counter extremist views by helping citizens to expand their understanding of 
the historical realities rather than be swayed by politically motivated discourses: 
 Sometimes, themes such as 1945 spark discussions of xenophobia [among 
visitor groups]. We are used to this, we have to stay very factual, even if 
something unfair comes up, we stay factual and then it can move forward. 
 (Interviewee from City Museum) 
 As staff member at the MHM points out: 
 The impressive, emotional staging will always make a bigger impression, 
but I think it is very important for historical perspectives to show a rational 
view on this. We need to use our rational faculties, nowadays it is often 
too emotionalised and this has a kind of ‘erosion effect’. I think we need a 
good strategy how to bring both together. To present something neutral, 
technical, and then also something more emotional and explain how they 
are part of the same. . . . It is always possible to emotionalise people more, 
but if that is what success is, well I would question that. 
 (Interviewee from MHM) 
 Although the museum staff shy away from overtly emotive or otherwise 
instrumental means to transmit this message to their visitors, the architectural 
design of those exhibition spaces does create a change of mood and pace for 
 Image 10.10  Exterior view of the Military History Museum Dresden showing the ‘Libes-
kind Keil’. 
 Source: Photo by Susannah Eckersley 
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visitors to both the City Museum and the MHM. For example, in the MHM 
the so called ‘ Libeskind Keil ’ – a shard of metal mesh which pierces the outer 
shell of the MHM building, stabbing into the heart of the internal structure – 
creates an internal space where the Dresden bombings are addressed sepa-
rately to the rest of the museums’ collections. In the City Museum, a similar 
effect is achieved – although on a much smaller scale and through less dra-
matic means – to create a narrow display area situated in between the displays 
on Nazism and the Holocaust and on the post-war rebuilding and early 
GDR period. 
 The exhibition strategies of foregrounding the perpetrator narrative and of 
contextual juxtapositioning of Dresden’s bombing with other cities, evident 
within both museums, are also utilized at the panorama of Dresden 1945. This 
is an immersive, panoramic image of Dresden, created by artist Yadegar Asisi and 
housed in a historic gasometer in a semi-industrial district of Dresden. An artis-
tic display strategy is inevitably different to a city or historical museum’s display 
strategy; however, the Dresden 1945 panorama and exhibition was developed in 
conjunction with historians from the MHM. The history of panorama displays 
is also more closely connected to overtly – and often political – instrumental 
ambitions (Bozoğlu 2019), and therefore runs counter to typical approaches to 
museum display in Germany. 
 Here, the use of strongly emotive sensory effects – changing light, colours, 
and sounds – culminating in the panorama showing a large-scale view of the 
destroyed city, is in stark contrast to the museums, despite the more nuanced 
contextual and historical positioning of the small exhibition which precedes 
the panorama itself. The overtly emotive and affective nature of this sensory 
experience, and the artistic license used in creating a single image within 
which time is compressed (it somehow manages to visually represent the city 
before, during, immediately after, and an indeterminate time after the bomb-
ing within its single panoramic image), results in an experience within which 
an emotional rather than a rational response seems inevitable – as well as 
intentional. The emotionality of the panorama means that – despite con-
textualization of the bombing in relation to both the Holocaust and other 
bombed cities – it aligns much more closely with the strategies employed 
at the different demonstrations. Firstly, its open appeal to emotions echoes 
the emotionality of the left-wing protests. Secondly, it reflects the emotive 
undercurrent to the right-wing commemorations, marches, and demonstra-
tions. This mixing of the ‘emotional’ with the supposedly ‘rational’ may seem 
counter-intuitive, but is in fact what underlies all attempts to separate emo-
tionality and rationality: 
 Emotions are seen to be the very antithesis of the detached scientific mind 
and its quest for ‘objectivity’, ‘truth’ and ‘wisdom’. Reason rather than 
emotions is regarded as the ‘indispensable faculty’ for the acquisition of 
human knowledge. Such a view neglects the fact that rational methods of 
 Image 10.11  Dresden City Museum’s narrow display area focusing on the Dresden 
firebombing. 
 Source: Photo by Susannah Eckersley 
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scientific inquiry, even at their most positivistic, involve the incorporation 
of values and emotions. 
 (Williams and Bendelow in  Bendelow and Williams 1997 : xiii) 
 The use of an apparently ‘rational’ and ‘unemotional’ response to the con-
troversy around Dresden’s firebombing can also been seen in the ‘memori-
alization’ and protest behaviour of the far-right groups, in stark contrast to 
that of the left-wing protesters. It appears that the populists and far right are 
using ‘appropriateness’ as a political tactic – by adopting the behavioural cri-
teria and values of the centre, they manage to appeal for wider acceptance. 
Their use of terms such as ‘ stilles gedenken ’ (silent remembrance) is a means 
to take the ‘moral high ground’ from the political and activist left wing. The 
left-wing protests and activist events where phrases like ‘Bomber Harris, do 
it again!’ have been repeated in relation to both Dresden’s history and con-
temporary issues with the far right become problematic as an ‘inappropriate’ 
response to civic commemoration or individual mourning. The impact of 
such ‘inappropriate’ slogans, together with the intentionally disruptive pro-
test behaviour of the left-wing demonstrators, is that the underlying sense 
of potentially violent emotional behaviour undermines their position as a 
whole as coming from a desire for peace. The more extreme and emotion-
ally loaded behaviours and statements of some of those protesting against 
the populists and the far right become associated with all of those on the 
left, in the same way that the measured, seemingly more ‘appropriate’ silent 
 Image 10.12 The Panorama Dresden 1945. 
 Source: Photo by Susannah Eckersley 
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commemoration behaviour of the populists and far right provides them with 
a cloak of respectability. 
 Drawing out the uses and strategies of ‘appropriateness’ highlights striking 
differences between the uses of emotions (not only in museums, but also in 
commemoration, protest, and public discourse in different countries) and indi-
cates the significance of the perceived ‘rationality’ or ‘emotionality’ of responses 
to politically charged dark heritage and within the wider cultural and memory 
context – in Germany and beyond. 
 Conclusion 
 While the narrative of victimhood is used to underpin discourses of othering, 
exclusion, racism, and xenophobia (what Ruth Wodak terms a politics of fear, 
 2015 ), the narrative of perpetration supports discourses of peace, inclusion, and 
welcome – what I am terming a politics of shame and pity. 
 These two narratives are very evident in the opposing political extremes 
involved in the demonstrations (as well as commemorations) taking place 
against the backdrop of 13 February, but also, in a more nuanced way, in the 
centre ground representations of this history and memory, such as the muse-
ums, memorial heritage sites, cultural performances, and public discussion 
forums. Added to this, the contemporary context of migration, multicultural-
ism, integration, and exclusion provides a further means by which not only the 
protesters but also the museums and cultural institutions continue these narra-
tives. We can clearly see a politics and discourse of fear from the far-right and 
populist movements – presenting themselves as culturally marginalized – and 
a politics of shame and pity from left-wing ‘peace’ protesters and the cultural 
institutions – where both ‘ordinary complicity’ during Nazism and positivist 
contemporary multiculturalism are highlighted. 
 So, while museums in general may feel they are being pulled in the direction 
of having to create more emotional encounters for visitors, amidst an inter-
national ‘affective turn’ in museum display, others are turning away from the 
use of emotion in order to gain legitimacy. We saw how right-wing protesters 
appear to have become aware of the value of presenting themselves as taking 
a serious role in commemoration in a socially ‘appropriate’ way, while their 
left-wing counterparts appear not to realize that their socially ‘inappropriate’ 
behaviour could be undermining their message. Either way, the historical facts 
of the bombing and the contemporary reality of refugees become subordinate 
to the manner in which the past is being presented to the wider public and to 
public perceptions of appropriateness and inappropriateness. 
 Investigating the multi-layered nature of, and multiple perspectives on, the 
approaches to commemoration and the presentation of the past in Dresden has 
provided a wealth of material for analysis. This has produced significant insights 
into the role of emotions and behaviours not only within dark heritage but also 
in contemporary uses of the past for political purposes. Memory, heritage, and 
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‘past-presencing’ combine in all the sites and settings analyzed – from large and 
small museums to far-right protests and left-wing counter-protests – to high-
light the significance of not only the past itself but also of our relationships to 
it, in the present and for the future. 
 In identifying the two axes – of appropriation (of the past, of commemora-
tive practice, of public space) and of appropriateness (in emotions, behaviour, 
discourses, and public history) – this study creates new intersections between 
disciplinary boundaries, providing a significant new analytical framework for 
understanding the changing nature of public, professional, and political responses 
to and manipulations of heritage, memory, and commemoration. The example 
of Dresden and the multiple case studies within it indicate how a ‘shared’ past, 
memory, and heritage may be used in diverging ways (and for divergent pur-
poses) by different actors. This has particular relevance to Germany, given the 
long-standing societal process of  Vergangenheitsbewältigung , yet the two axes can 
also be used to analyze both historical and contemporary social, cultural, and 
political phenomena elsewhere, allowing researchers to identify the strategies 
being adopted by other actors to push their own political agendas and to reach 
wider audiences. In a time characterized as being both part of a ‘memory boom’ 
and a ‘post-truth’ era, it may be more important than ever to develop and apply 
such tools in order to analyze, understand, and respond to the appropriation of 
political, social, and cultural history for contemporary political purposes. 
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 Notes 
 1 Interviews conducted by Susannah Eckersley with one staff member at Military History 
Museum, Dresden, on 8 February 2018, one staff member of Dresden City Museum on 
13 February 2018, and one staff member of Saxon State Ministry for Culture on 9 Febru-
ary 2018. Survey interviews conducted by CoHERE project researcher with supporters 
of AfD in Dresden in 2017. 
 2 Many of these are listed on  http://13februar.dresden.de/de/veranstaltungen.php . 
 3 Around 100,000 people were massacred by the Nazis at Babi Yar, near Kiev. 
 4 This information was gathered through direct participant observation – I observed the 
protests from the side of the Altmarkt where the left-wing counter-demonstration was 
located and as a result was kettled with this group until late in the evening. My colleague, 
Ian McDonald, who was making a film of the events for the CoHERE project, crossed 
from the left-wing protest area to the right-wing protest area when the sit-in protest 
began and remained with the right-wing demonstrators until the protests dispersed. Prior 
to this we had been working alongside one another to observe and record the variety 
of events of 13 February commemoration and protest, and we met up again later that 
evening after the two protests had mainly dispersed to compare notes on events from 
our different standpoints. The reporting of the two protests and the course of events 
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surrounding them in the official print media as well as on Twitter by the police and press 
included a number of factual errors – the length of time left-wing protesters were kettled, 
for example – in comparison to my own recording of events. Ian McDonald’s film of the 
protest events is available online at  https://vimeo.com/303706985 . 
 5 Both demonstrations were carefully observed by experts from the  Versammlungsbehörde 
(Office for Assembly), who did step in to ensure that actions and statements being made 
publicly did not run counter to German laws on freedom of assembly, freedom of speech, 
and Holocaust denial. A record of police interventions on 13 February was provided by 
the Saxon Interior Ministry in response to a question from a member of that parliament: 
 https://kleineanfragen.de/sachsen/6/12481-strafermittlungen-anlaesslich-der-versam-
mlungen-rund-um-den-13-februar-2018-in-dresden . 
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